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IV*-THE VOICE OF CONSCIENCE1 
by J. David Velleman 
ABSTRACT I reconstruct Kant's derivation of the Categorical Imperative (CI) as 
an argument that deduces what the voice of conscience must say from how it must 
sound-that is, from the authority that is metaphorically attributed to conscience 
in the form of a resounding voice. The idea of imagining the CI as the voice of 
conscience comes from Freud; and the present reconstruction is part of a larger 
project that aims to reconcile Kant's moral psychology with Freud's theory of 
moral development. As I reconstruct it, Kant's argument yields an imperative 
commanding us to act for reasons whose validity we can consistently will to be 
common knowledge among all agents. Universalizing a maxim thus turns out to 
consist in willing, not that there be some universally quantified rule of conduct, 
but rather that a principle of practical reasoning be common knowledge-as a 
principle of reasoning ought to be. 
How do you recognize the voice of your conscience? One 
possibility is that you recognize this voice by what it talks 
about-namely, your moral obligations, what you morally ought 
or ought not to do. Yet if the dictates of conscience were 
recognizable by their subject matter, you wouldn't need to think of 
them as issuing from a distinct faculty or in a distinctive voice. You 
wouldn't need the concept of a conscience, any more than you need 
concepts of distinct mental faculties for politics or etiquette. Talk 
of conscience and its dictates would be like talk of the mince-pie 
syllogism, in that it would needlessly elevate a definable subject 
matter to the status of a form or faculty of reasoning.2 
1. In writing this paper I have drawn on conversations and correspondence with Marcia 
Baron, Jennifer Church, Stephen Darwall, David Hills, David Phillips, and Connie Rosati. 
Work on this paper has been supported by a sabbatical leave from the College of Literature, 
Science, and the Arts, University of Michigan; and by a fellowship from the National 
Endowment for the Humanities. 
2. The mince pie syllogism was the ironic invention of Elizabeth Anscombe. Anscombe 
objected to the notion that the practical syllogism was merely a syllogism on a practical 
topic, such as what one ought to do. She argued that if there were a distinct logical form for 
reasoning about what one ought to do, then there might as well be distinct forms for 
reasoning about every definable topic, including mince pies. (Intention [Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1957], 58.) 
*Meeting of the Aristotelian Society, held in Senate House, University of London, on 
Monday, 23rd November, 1998 at 8.15 p.m. 
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Our having the concept of a conscience suggests, on the contrary, 
that ordinary practical thought does not contain a distinct, moral 
sense of 'ought' that lends a distinct, moral content to some 
practical conclusions. The point of talking about the conscience 
and its voice is precisely to mark a distinction among thoughts that 
are not initially distinguishable in content. Among the many 
conclusions we draw about what we ought or ought not to do, some 
but not others resonate in a particular way that marks them as 
dictates of conscience. The phrase 'morally ought' is a 
philosophical coinage that introduces a difference of sense where 
ordinary thought has only a difference of voice-whatever that is. 
But what is it? Conscience doesn't literally speak. The idea of its 
addressing you in a voice is thus an image, albeit an image that 
may infiltrate your experience of moral thought and not just your 
descriptions of it. Yet whether the dictates of conscience are 
somehow experienced as spoken or are just described as such after 
the fact, this image must represent something significant about 
them, or it wouldn't be used to identify them as a distinctive mode 
of thought. The question is what literal feature of these thoughts is 
represented by the image of their being delivered in a voice. 
The answer, I think, is that the dictates of conscience carry an 
authority that distinguishes them from other thoughts about what 
you ought or ought not to do.3 The voice of conscience is, 
metaphorically speaking, the voice of this authority. To recognize 
an 'ought' as delivered in the voice of conscience is to recognize 
it as carrying a different degree or kind of authority from the 
ordinary 'ought', and hence as due a different degree or kind of 
deference. 
If the voice of conscience does represent a distinctive authority 
that accompanies some practical conclusions, then it is more than 
a curiosity of moral psychology: it symbolizes a fundamental 
feature of morality, regarded by some philosophers as the 
fundamental feature. Kant, in particular, thought that what morality 
requires can be deduced from the authority that must accompany 
its requirements. If Kant had written in the imagery of conscience, 
he might have put it like this: by reflecting on how the voice of 
3. The authority of conscience is the central theme of Butler's Sermons. For a recent 
discussion of Butler, see Stephen Darwall, The British Moralists and the Internal 'Ought' 
1640-1740 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), Chapter 9. 
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conscience must sound, you can deduce what it must say- 
whereupon you will have heard it speak. 
Of course, Kant didn't formulate his moral theory in these terms, 
but I think that they can be substituted for terms such as 'duty' and 
'moral law' in Kant's own formulations, with some gain in clarity 
and persuasiveness for modem readers. My goal is to reconstruct 
Kant's categorical imperative in the terms of conscience and its 
voice.4 
The idea of reconstructing the categorical imperative as the voice 
of conscience originated with Freud. Freud was interested in the 
voice of conscience because he thought that it could explain why 
paranoiacs heard voices commenting on their behaviour;5 and that 
it could in turn be explained by the psychological origins of 
conscience in parental discipline 'conveyed... by the medium of 
the voice'.6 In tracing conscience to the voice of parental 
discipline, Freud also thought that he could explain why its power 
'manifests itself in the form of a categorical imperative.'7 This 
explanation showed, according to Freud, that 'Kant's Categorical 
Imperative is... the direct heir of the Oedipus complex'.8 
My view, which I cannot defend here,9 is that the categorical 
imperative can indeed be identified with the super-ego, at least in 
one of its guises. For I think that the categorical imperative is what 
Freud would call an ego ideal. The ego ideal, in Freudian theory, 
is that aspect of the super-ego which represents the excellences of 
parental figures whom the subject loved and consequently 
4. There is at least one passage in which Kant uses the word 'conscience' in reference to 
the activity of applying the categorical imperative: Groundwork of the Metaphysic of 
Morals, trans. H.J. Paton (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 89 (422). (Page numbers in 
parentheses refer to the Prussian Academy Edition.) 
5. 'On Narcissism: An Introduction', in The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 14, ed. James Strachey (London: The Hogarth 
Press, 1957), 69-102, at 95. See also Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, S.E. 
18: 67-143, at 110 [53]; New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, S.E. 22: 3-182, at 
59 [74]. (Page numbers in brackets refer to the Norton paperback volumes of individual 
works from the Standard Edition.) 
6. 'On Narcissism', 14: 96. 
7. The Ego and the Id, S.E. 19: 3-66, at 35, 48 [31, 49]. Freud also uses this phrase in Totem 
and Taboo, S.E. 13: ix-1 62, at 22. 
8. 'The Economic Problem of Masochism', S.E. 19: 156-70, at 167. Freud also identified 
the super-ego with the Kantian 'moral law within us' (New Introductory Lectures, 22: 61, 
163 [77, 202]). 
9. But see 'The Direct Heir of the Oedipus Complex' (MS). 
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idealized when he was a child.10 Although Kant often framed the 
categorical imperative as a rule for the will to follow, I think that it 
is better understood as an ideal for the will to emulate, in that it 
describes an ideal configuration of the will itself. And I think that 
this ideal could indeed be internalized from parental figures as they 
appear to the eyes of a loving child. 
This conception of the categorical imperative as an ego ideal will 
reappear at the end of this paper, but it is not my immediate concern. 
What concerns me here is Freud's suggestion that the categorical 
imperative can be identified with the voice of conscience. 
The image of conscience as having a voice is potentially 
misleading in one respect. Taken literally, the image may lead us 
to think of conscience as an external intelligence whispering in our 
ears, like Socrates's daimon. Even when taken figuratively, the 
image still suggests that the dictates of conscience occur to us 
unbidden, as thoughts that we don't actively think for ourselves, 
and hence as external to us, in the sense made familiar by the work 
of Harry Frankfurt. 11 
Conscience is most likely to seem external in this sense when it 
opposes temptation: conscience and temptation can seem like 
parties to a dispute on which we sit as independent adjudicators. 
Yet even this judicial image is misleading, since the disputing 
parties do not appear as distinct from ourselves. We ourselves play 
each role in the mental courtroom, now advocating the case of 
temptation, now that of conscience, representing each side in 
propria persona. In short, we vacillate-which entails speaking in 
different voices, not just hearing them. 
Thus, hearing the voice of our conscience is not really a matter 
of hearing voices. It's rather a matter of recognizing a voice in 
which we sometimes speak to ourselves. 
Freud's theory of the super-ego might seem to favour the image of 
conscience as an independent agency, distinct from and in 
opposition to the self. Freud certainly thought that in cases of 
10. Freud's views on the relation between super-ego and ego ideal are clearly summarized 
in Joseph Sandler, Alex Holder, and Dale Meers, 'The Ego Ideal and the Ideal Self', 18 The 
Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 139-58 (1963). See also Joseph Sandler, 'On the Concept 
of the Superego', 15 The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 128-62 (1960). 
11. The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), especially chapters 2, 5, 7, and 12. 
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mental illness, the super-ego could become the source of voices 
heard involuntarily, and hence from outside the self in Frankfurt's 
sense.12 Yet in the normal subject, the super-ego bears an 
ambiguous relation to the self. It is 'a differentiating grade in the 
ego',13 and the process of introjection by which it is formed is a 
way of identifying with other people, which is necessarily a 
deployment of the self. So another description of what happens 
when the super-ego addresses the ego is that the self identifies with 
others in addressing itself. 
Although Kant doesn't tend to speak of the conscience per se, 
his moral philosophy also reflects the complexity of its relation to 
the self. On the one hand, Kant says that the moral law is necessary 
and inescapable; on the other hand, he describes it as a law that we 
give to ourselves. For Kant, giving ourselves the moral law 
represents both our exercise of an autonomous will and our 
subjection to a necessity larger than ourselves; just as, for Freud, 
conscience is the ego addressing itself in the voice of external 
authority. 14 
This analogy reveals what is right about Freud's claim that the 
voice of the super-ego is the voice of Kant's categorical imperative. 
The necessity to which we submit in the law that we give to 
ourselves can be imagined as the authority we recognize in a voice 
with which we address ourselves-namely, the voice of 
conscience. I want to show that Kant's attempt to derive the content 
of the moral law from the very concept of its practical necessity 
can be restaged as an attempt to derive the words of conscience 
from the authoritative sound of its voice. 
An example of rational authority. The first step in this 
reconstruction of Kantian ethics is to analyze the authority that 
Kant would attribute to the conscience. Whereas Freud thought of 
the conscience as the seat of internalized parental authority, Kant 
would think of it-if he thought in such terms at all-as a seat of 
rational authority. But what sort of authority is that? 
1 2. See the passages cited in note 5, above. 
13. This is the title of Chapter XI of Group Psychology. 
14. Kant seems to reject the image of an external voice of conscience at Groundwork 93 
(425-26), where he insists that moral philosophy cannot serve 'as the mouthpiece of laws 
whispered to her by some implanted sense or by who knows what tutelary nature...'. 
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Consider, by way of analogy, the authority of cognitive 
judgments whose propositional content is self-evidently true. You 
make such a judgment, for example, when you confirm for yourself 
that 2+2=4. To say that such a judgment is authoritative is to say 
that it merits deference. But why should anyone defer to your 
judgment on matters of elementary arithmetic? 
The answer is not that you're especially well positioned to think 
about such matters. When it comes to adding 2 and 2, all thinkers 
are in the same position. But for that very reason, a computation 
performed by you here and now can take the place of anyone's, 
including your own on future occasions. That is, you can compute 
the sum of 2 and 2 once and for all, in that you would only 
compute it similarly in the future; and you can also compute it one 
for all, in that others would only compute it similarly, too. Your 
judgment is thus authoritative because it can serve as proxy for 
anyone's, including your later selves'. To see yourself as judging 
authoritatively is to see yourself as judging for all in this sense- 
in the sense, that is, of judging as anyone would. 
But what if your judging as anyone would were, in turn, a matter 
on which judgments might differ? In that case, your arithmetic 
judgment might only seem authoritative to you. Surely, however, 
you recognize your judgment as having an authority that anyone 
would recognize. You must therefore see yourself as judging, not 
just as anyone would, but as anyone would judge that anyone 
would. 
And now an infinite regress rears its head. For what if judgments 
could differ as to whether you were judging as anyone would judge 
that anyone would-and so on? Fortunately, there is independent 
reason to expect such a regress in the present context, and also to 
regard it as benign. 
The reason is that the facts of elementary arithmetic are common 
knowledge among those who consider them, and common 
knowledge involves a regress of the present form. Anyone who 
adds 2 and 2 sees, not just that it's 4, but also that anyone who added 
2 and 2 would see that it's 4, and that such a person would see this, 
too, and so on. The facts of elementary arithmetic are like objects 
in a public space, where everyone sees whatever everyone else sees, 
and everyone sees everyone else seeing it. Unlike publicly visible 
objects, however, the facts of arithmetic are common knowledge 
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among all possible thinkers rather than a finite population of actual 
viewers. 
As a participant in this common knowledge, you have higher- 
order knowledge about the judgments of all other thinkers, and 
about theirjudgments about the judgments of all. This higher-order 
knowledge constitutes a perception of authority in your own 
judgment that 2+2=4, since it represents this judgment as that 
which anyone would think, and would think that anyone would 
think, and so on. 
So it's just as we might have expected: the voice of authority is the 
one with the reverb. But now we know the source of the 
reverberations. A judgment resounds with authority when it is 
perceived as echoing and re-echoing in the minds of all other 
thinkers, as it does when its content is a matter of common 
knowledge. 
This authority attaches, as we have seen, to items of a priori 
knowledge, such as the judgment that 2+2=4. Items of a priori 
knowledge would seem to be the only bearers of this authority, in 
fact, since only the a priori can be regarded as what anyone would 
think, or be thought to think, and so on. 
The authority of the moral law. I suspect that the form of common 
knowledge among all thinkers-of that which anyone would think, 
and would think that anyone would think, and so on-is the form 
that Kant attributes to the moral law in calling it universal. Of 
course, Kant thinks that the moral law is universal in the sense that 
it applies to all rational creatures; and the most economical way of 
representing a universally applicable law is with a universal 
quantifier, as in 'All rational creatures must keep their promises' 
or 'No rational creature may lie'. But serious problems, both 
textual and philosophical, stand in the way of reading Kant's talk 
of universal law as referring to universally quantified rules. 
Consider, to begin with, these two passages from the 
Groundwork. 
Everyone must admit that a law, if it is to hold morally-that is, as 
the ground of an obligation-must carry with it absolute necessity; 
that the command 'Thou shalt not lie' does not hold just for men, 
without other rational beings having to heed it, and similarly with 
all the other genuine moral laws; and that consequently the ground 
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of obligation here must be sought, not in the nature of man or in the 
circumstances of the world where he is located, but solely a priori 
in the concepts of pure reason. 15 
It may be added that unless we wish to deny to the concept of 
morality all truth and all relation to a possible object, we cannot 
dispute that its law is of such widespread significance as to hold, 
not merely for men, but for all rational beings as such-not merely 
subject to contingent conditions and exceptions, but with absolute 
necessity.... And how could laws for determining our will be taken 
as laws for determining the will of a rational being as such-and 
only because of this for determining ours-if these laws were 
merely empirical and did not have their source completely a priori 
in pure, but practical reason?16 
These passages are central to the Groundwork, because they 
introduce the conceptual connections among morality, universality, 
and the a priori-the connections through which Kant hopes to 
derive the content of the categorical imperative from the very 
concept of morality. The passages argue that the concept of 
morality entails that its laws carry 'absolute necessity'; which 
entails that they hold not only for men but for all rational creatures; 
which entails that they hold a priori. 
Suppose that we interpret his argument as using the word 'laws' 
to denote general rules, and as contrasting rules that quantify over 
men with rules that quantify over rational creatures. We must then 
wonder why the former rules are any less necessary than the latter, 
since the former apply necessarily to anything insofar as it is a man, 
just as the latter apply necessarily to anything insofar as it is 
rational, and either represent some conduct as necessary for the 
relevant agents. 'All men must keep their promises' and 'All 
rational creatures must keep their promises' would seem to be 
equally necessary, each within its specified domain. We may also 
wonder why the concept of morality calls for laws of the latter 
form. Couldn't there be a distinctively human morality, in which 
'All men must keep their promises' would count as a law? Finally, 
we may wonder why such a law could not follow a priori from the 
concept of a man, just as a rule quantifying over rational creatures 
might follow from the concepts of reason and rationality. 
15. Groundwork vi (389), my translation. For reasons that will be explained below, I have 
brought this passage into conformity with Paton's translation of the following passage, in 
which 'gelten fiir' is translated as 'hold for'. 
16. Groundwork 76 (408). 
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Note, however, that Kant's example of absolute necessity is not 
a general rule that quantifies over all rational creatures. His example 
is rather a second-person command, 'Thou shalt not lie'. And what 
Kant says about such a requirement is not that it must refer to all 
rational creatures but that it must 'hold for' them-an expression 
that he repeats throughout the Groundwork, as we shall see. 
Of course, the pronoun in 'Thou shalt not lie' might be standing 
in for a universal quantifier, and what's at issue could be the domain 
of that implicit quantifier. Yet if the issue were whether 'thou' 
referred to all men or to all rational creatures, then Kant wouldn't 
ask for whom the rule holds. The rule, fully spelled out, would be 
either '(All) thou (men) shall not lie' or '(All) thou (rational 
creatures) shall not lie', and in either case it would have to hold or 
not hold, without limitation. 'All men shall not lie' cannot hold only 
locally or selectively, any more than 'All men are mortal'. 
Suppose, however, that 'Thou shalt not lie' were a type of which 
various tokens were addressed to various agents, with corres- 
ponding variance in the reference of the pronoun. Commands of 
this type could be said to 'hold for' particular agents in two related 
senses: they might be authoritative from the perspectives of 
particular agents as addressees, and they might consequently be 
valid in application to those agents. To ask for whom the rule holds 
would be to ask who finds himself addressed by an authoritative 
command of this type. 
According to this interpretation, Kant isn't thinking of moral 
requirements as universally quantified rules; he's thinking of them 
as personally addressed practical thoughts, of the form 'Thou shalt 
not lie'. We can now extend the interpretation so as to explain 
Kant's chain of inferences. 
For suppose, next, that when Kant insists on the 'absolute 
necessity' of moral requirements, he means that the corresponding 
thought must be absolutely authoritative from the perspective of the 
addressee: an agent should not be able to exempt himself from the 
force of such a thought. Absolute necessity, so understood, can 
indeed be said to follow from the very concept of a moral require- 
ment. So we have accounted for the first link in Kant's chain. 
Now suppose that 'Thou shalt not lie' would be absolutely 
authoritative, in the requisite sense, if and only if it were what any 
agent would think to himself upon considering whether to lie, and 
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would think that any agent would think, and so on. If it were such 
a thought, then an agent considering whether to lie would not only 
think to himself 'Thou shalt not lie' but would also think of himself 
as having nothing else to think, because this thought would strike 
him as what anyone would think on the subject, including himself 
on other occasions. He would therefore think of the question as 
having been settled once and for all-or, in other words, authori- 
tatively. By contrast, if 'Thou shalt not lie' weren't such a thought, 
then even an agent who thought it would regard it as optional, there 
being other things that anyone, including himself, might think on 
the subject. He would therefore find it lacking in authority. Here is 
a sense in which the absolute authority entailed in the very concept 
of moral requirements can be seen to consist in their 'holding for' 
all rational agents-that is, by constituting what anyone would 
think, or would think that anyone would think, and so on. We have 
now accounted for the second link in Kant's chain.17 
The third link follows without further suppositions. The form of 
what anyone would think, and would think that anyone would 
think, and so on-the form, if you like, of that than which there is 
nothing else to think-is the form of a priori knowledge. When it 
attaches to a thought such as 'Thou shalt not lie', it yields a thought 
that is simultaneously a priori and practical. Hence the very 
concept of a moral requirement can be seen to entail an absolute 
authority that is found only in a priori practical thought.18 Kant's 
argument is now complete. 
I have embroidered this interpretive hypothesis on two mere 
swatches of text. How it will look against the broader fabric of 
Kantian ethics remains to be seen. First, however, I want to register 
an important qualification. 
My hypothesis is that moral laws, for Kant, are not universally 
quantified rules but rather personally addressed practical thoughts, 
whose universality and authority both consist in their being what 
anyone would think, and would think that anyone would think, and 
so on. Yet if 'Don't lie' is universal in this sense, then everyone in 
the relevant circumstances will find himself with nothing else to 
17. See also Groundwork 92-3 (425): '[D]uty has to be a practical, unconditioned necessity 
of action; it must therefore hold for all rational beings...'. 
18. See Groundwork 93 (426): 'These principles must have an origin entirely and 
completely a priori and must at the same time derive from this their sovereign authority....' 
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think; and if everyone in the relevant circumstances finds himself 
with nothing else to think but 'Don't lie', then there will, in effect, 
be a universal rule of not lying. 
For this reason, my hypothesis cannot be that moral laws, for 
Kant, aren't universally quantified rules at all; it must be that they 
aren't universally quantified rules in the first instance. Moral laws, 
as I understand them, can be expressed in universally quantified 
rules, provided that those rules are understood as expressing the 
authority of personal practical thoughts, whose authority just 
consists in their being what anyone would think that anyone would 
think. 
Let me emphasize, then, that I do not mean to ignore or dismiss 
the many passages in which Kant himself enunciates laws as 
universally quantified rules of behaviour. I merely suggest that the 
universal rules enunciated by Kant should be understood as 
summaries of something more complex, or as the outer surfaces of 
something deeper-namely, a state of affairs in which practical 
thoughts, in personal form, are common knowledge among all 
agents. 
How universalization works. With this qualification in mind, I want 
to apply my interpretive hypothesis to Kant's account of 
universalization, the procedure by which maxims are tested under 
the categorical imperative. Here, too, the hypothesis helps to 
resolve both textual and philosophical problems. 
Consider this instance of universalization: 19 
[A person] finds himself driven to borrowing money because of 
need. He well knows that he will not be able to pay it back but he 
sees too that he will get no loan unless he gives a firm promise to 
pay it back within a fixed time. He is inclined to make such a 
promise; but he has still enough conscience to ask 'Is it not unlawful 
and contrary to duty to get out of difficulties in this way?' 
Supposing, however, he did resolve to do so, the maxim of his action 
would run thus: 'Whenever I believe myself short of money, I will 
borrow money and promise to pack it back, though I know that this 
will never be done.' Now this principle of self-love or personal 
advantage is perhaps quite compatible with my own entire future 
welfare; only there remains the question 'Is it right?' I therefore 
transform the demand of self-love into a universal law and frame 
19. Groundwork 90 (422). I have brought Paton's version of this passage into conformity 
with his translation of the preceding passage, by rendering 'gelten' as 'to hold'. (See note 
15, above.) 
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my question thus: 'How would things stand if my maxim became a 
universal law?' I then see straight away that this maxim can never 
hold as a universal law of nature and be self-consistent, but must 
necessarily contradict itself. For the universality of a law that every 
one believing himself to be in need can make any promise he pleases 
with the intention not to keep it would make promising, and the very 
purpose of promising, itself impossible, since no one would believe 
he was being promised anything, but would laugh at utterances of 
this kind as empty shams. 
The target of universalization in this passage is what Kant calls 
a maxim of action: 'Whenever I believe myself short of money, I 
will borrow money and promise to pay it back, though I know that 
this will never be done.' We might think that the way to make this 
maxim universal is to replace the first-person pronoun with 
quantified variables ranging over all rational creatures.20 Kant 
seems to suggest such a procedure when he refers to 'the 
universality of a law that every one believing himself to be in need 
can make any promise he pleases...'. But Kant also suggests a 
different procedure, when he considers whether his maxim itself 
'can... hold as a universal law'. Kant's maxim is framed in the first 
person, and so it-the maxim itself-can 'hold' as a universal law 
only if first-personal thoughts can somehow be universal. 
Kant's framing his maxim in the first person is no accident. He 
could not have restated it, for example, as 'Immanuel Kant will 
make lying promises when he is in need'. Such a third-personal 
thought would not be a maxim of action, since it could not be acted 
upon by the thinker until he reformulated it reflexively, in the first 
person. Insofar as the target of universalization is a practical 
thought, it is essentially first-personal.21 
20. For an interpretation of universalization along these lines, see e.g. Onora O'Neill, 
Acting on Principle: an Essay on Kantian Ethics (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1975), esp. Chapter Five, 59-93; and 'Consistency in Action', in Constructions of Reason; 
Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), 81-104. See also Christine Korsgaard, 'Kant's Formula of Universal Law', in 
Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 77-105. 
According to Korsgaard, universalization 'is carried out by imagining, in effect, that the 
action you propose to perform in order to carry out your purpose is the standard procedure 
for carrying out that purpose' (92). In the present case, then, the agent 'imagines a world in 
which everyone who needs money makes a lying promise and he imagines that, at the same 
time, he is part of that world, willing his maxim' ('Kant's Analysis of Obligation: the 
Argument of Groundwork I', in ibid., 43-76, at 63). Finally, see Roger J. Sullivan, Kant's 
Moral Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 168-69. 
21. On this topic, see John Perry, The Problem of the Essential Indexical and Other Essays 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
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This first-personal thought should remind us of the second- 
personal injunction considered above, 'Thou shalt not lie', which 
was there regarded as being addressed by the agent to himself. So 
regarded, 'Thou shalt not lie' was couched in what might be called 
the reflexive second-person-the second-person of talking to 
oneself. And when it is thus addressed to oneself, 'Thou shalt not 
lie' is just the contradictory of 'I shall lie', the maxim that is 
currently up for universalization. Our earlier reflections on how the 
second-personal injunction could be a universal law are thus 
directly relevant to the universalization of the first-personal maxim. 
As before, we might consider transforming the maxim into a 
universal law, by substitution of a quantifier for the first-person 
pronoun. But Kant speaks more often of maxims' being laws 
themselves than of their being transformed into laws. In addition 
to asking whether a maxim can 'hold as a universal law',22 he asks: 
whether maxims can 'serve as universal laws',23 whether they have 
'universal validity... as laws'24 or 'the universality of a law'25 
whether a maxim 'at the same time contains in itself its own 
universal validity for every rational being'26 or is constrained 'by 
the condition that it should be universally valid as a law for every 
subject' ;27 whether it 'can have for its object itself as at the same 
time a universal law'28 or can 'have as its content itself considered 
as a universal law'.29 All of these expressions call for a single 
thought to be regarded simultaneously as the maxim of one agent 
and as a law for all. 
According to my interpretation, however, a single thought can 
simultaneously be a first-personal maxim and a universal law, if it 
is what anyone would think in response to the relevant practical 
question, and would think that anyone would think, and so on. It is 
then a type of thought whose tokens would be authoritative for any 
agent. And imagining that 'I will make false promises' would be 
22. Also at 103-4 (438). 
23. 94 (426). 
24. 126 (458); see also 129 (461). 
25. 128 (460). 
26. 105 (437-38). 
27. 105 (438). 
28. 114 (447). 
29. 115 (447). 
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authoritative for anyone is a way of imagining a universal law of 
making false promises. 
This interpretation explains how an individual maxim can 'have 
as its content itself considered as a universal law'30 or 'contain in 
itself its own universal validity for every rational being'.31 
Universalizing a first-personal maxim ('I will make false 
promises') is not, in the first instance, a process of conjoining it 
with some universally quantified variant of itself ('Everyone will 
make false promises'). Universalizing this maxim is rather a 
matter of regarding the maxim itself as what anyone would think, 
or would think that anyone would think, and so on. The 
universalized maxim is more like this-'Obviously, I will make 
false promises'-where 'obviously' indicates that the following 
thought would occur to anyone, as would occur to anyone, and so 
on. That's how a first-personal maxim can contain its own 
universal validity within itself. 
Kant says that a universal law of making false promises would have 
the result that 'no one would believe he was being promised 
anything, but would laugh at utterances of this kind as empty 
shams'. If we think of this law as a universally quantified rule, to 
the effect that everyone may or will make false promises when in 
need, then we shall have to wonder why it would have the results 
predicted. 
The answer might be that people's adherence to such a law would 
entail the issuance of so many false promises that everyone would 
eventually learn to distrust everyone else.32 But this answer would 
be a piece of empirical reasoning, about how social interactions 
would evolve in response to a particular pattern of conduct; whereas 
Kant says that the requirements of morality must be derivable a 
30. 115 (447). 
31. 105 (437-38). 
32. For this interpretation, see O'Neill, 'Universal Laws and Ends-in-Themselves', in 
Constructions of Reason, 126-44, at 132: 'The project of deceit requires a world with 
sufficient trust for deceivers to get others to believe them; the results of universal deception 
would be a world in which such trust was lacking, and the deceiver's project was 
impossible.' See also Korsgaard, 'Kant's Formula of Universal Law', 92: 'The efficacy of 
the false promise as a means of securing the money depends on the fact that not everyone 
uses promises this way. Promises are efficacious in securing loans only because they are 
believed, and they are believed only if they are normally true.' Finally, see Sullivan, Kant's 
Moral Theory, 171: 'Truthful assertions cannot survive any universal violation of the 
essential point of such speech. Once everyone lies for what each considers a "good" reason, 
we can never know when any verbal behavior counts as "telling the truth".' 
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priori. This piece of empirical reasoning would therefore be out of 
place in the process of universalization, by which the specific 
requirements of morality are derived. 
What's more, the same empirical reasoning wouldn't apply to a 
law licensing promises whose falsity would go undetected, since 
the proliferation of undetectably false promises would not 
undermine people's trust; yet Kant reaches the same conclusion 
about a law of undetectable falsehoods. He imagines a case in 
which 'I have in my possession a deposit, the owner of which has 
died without leaving any record of it'. Moral reflection in these 
circumstances raises the question 'whether I could... make the law 
that every man is allowed to deny that a deposit has been made 
when no one can prove the contrary'. Kant's conclusion is 'that 
taking such a principle as a law would annihilate itself, because its 
result would be that no one would make a deposit'.33 This 
conclusion cannot be an empirical prediction of what would 
happen under a universally quantified rule of denying unrecorded 
deposits. General adherence to such a rule would not in fact 
discourage prospective depositors, precisely because there would 
be no record of the deposits involved. 
In my view, however, the way to imagine a universal law of 
denying unrecorded deposits is to imagine that the maxim 'I will 
deny unrecorded deposits' is authoritative, in that it is what anyone 
would think, and would think that anyone would think, and so on. 
This law would indeed undermine the faith of prospective 
depositors-not empirically, through the pattern of conduct it 
produced; but rationally, through the a priori practical thinking that 
it embodied, which would be common knowledge among all 
agents. No one would make unrecorded deposits if stealing them 
were all there was to think of doing with them. 
If the maxim of denying unrecorded deposits were a law in this 
sense, then the authority of that maxim would be evident to 
prospective depositors no less than it was to their intended trustee, 
since the maxim would be what anyone would think that anyone 
33. Critique of Practical Reason, trans. by Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 
1956), 27 (27). The same case appears, with embellishments, in the essay 'On the Proverb: 
That may be True in Theory, But Is of No Practical Use', in Perpetual Peace and Other 
Essays, trans. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1983), 61-92, at 69-70 (286-287). 
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would think. Depositors would only have to reason about the case 
from the perspective of their trustee in order to see what his maxim 
for dealing with their deposits would be, since there would be 
nothing else to think of doing with them. That the trustee would 
deny having received their deposits isn't something that depositors 
would have learned from past experience of his or anyone else's 
behaviour; it's something that would be evident to them through 
their own practical reasoning, as proxy for his. They would 
consequently be deterred from making unrecorded deposits. 
This interpretation simply assumes that the connections 
fundamental to Kant's conception of morality-the connections 
among universality, necessity, and the a priori-hold for all of the 
laws involved in universalization, including: (1) the categorical 
imperative, in which the procedure of universalization is 
prescribed; (2) the specific requirements derived by means of that 
procedure; and, finally but crucially, (3) the laws imagined within 
it. In this last instance, imagining one's maxim to be a universal 
law must entail imagining it to have all three connected 
properties-that is, to be universally inescapable a priori. Hence 
universalization is a procedure of imagining one's maxim to 
constitute practical but a priori and hence common knowledge. 
The nature of maxims. Thus far I have avoided inquiring into the 
nature of maxims, choosing instead to work with simple 
expressions of intent, such as 'I'll make false promises' or 'I'll 
deny unrecorded deposits'. Now that I have offered an hypothesis 
as to how maxims are universalized, however, I can no longer avoid 
the question of what they are and, more importantly, why they 
might be subject to such a procedure. And I don't think that maxims 
are simply intentions or expressions of intent. 
Kant says that maxims are 'principles of volition'.34 Many 
interpreters have noted that Kant usually formulates maxims of 
action so as to specify both a type of behaviour and a purpose to be 
served by it-or, in other words, an end as well as a means.35 I think 
that maxims so often connect end and means, and do so in the form 
34. Groundwork 68 (400). 
35. See O'Neill, Acting on Principle, 37-38; Korsgaard, 'Kant's Analysis of Obligation', 
57-58, and The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
108. 
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of general principles, because they state the connection between 
reasons and action.36 
Consider again the maxim of a lying promise: 'Whenever I 
believe myself short of money, I will borrow money and promise 
to pay it back, though I know that this will never be done'. I 
interpret this maxim to mean that financial need is a reason for 
promising to return a loan, and that this reason outweighs the 
countervailing consideration that the promise would be false. The 
maxim is thus a principle of volition in the sense that it licenses a 
practical inference, from the premises 'I need morney' and 'I'd be 
lying if I promised to repay a loan', to the conclusion 'I'll promise 
to repay a loan'. The license for this inference is framed as a general 
principle because the validity of an inference-type cannot vary 
from one token to another. 
More importantly, the validity of an inference is a logical relation 
that must be recognizable a priori. That's why a maxim is naturally 
subject to the test of universalization. If there is a valid inference 
from 'I need money' to 'I'll make a false promise', then the validity 
of that inference must be such as anyone would recognize, and 
would recognize that anyone would recognize, and so on. The 
validity of a practical inference, like the validity of modus ponens, 
must hold for-and be common knowledge among-all thinkers. 
In this case, the inference can't be valid, precisely because its 
validity would have to be common knowledge, which would 
undermine a presupposition of the inference itself-namely, that 
making false promises is a means of getting money.37 If it were 
common knowledge that a decision to make false promises 
followed from a need for money, then nobody would lend on the 
basis of promises; promises wouldn't be a means of getting money; 
and a decision to make them would no longer follow. Thus, if 'I'll 
make false promises' did follow from 'I need money', then it 
36. See Korsgaard, 'An Introduction to the Ethical, Political, and Religious Thought of 
Kant', in Creating the Kingdom of Ends, 3-42, at 13-14: 'Your maxim must contain your 
reason for action: it must say what you are going to do, and why'; 'Kant's Analysis of 
Obligation', 57: 'Your maxim thus expresses what you take to be a reason for action.' I am 
inclined to put a slightly finer point on this claim, by saying that the maxim states the rule 
of practical inference, from reason to action. 
37. Here I follow what Korsgaard calls 'the practical contradiction interpretation' ('Kant's 
Formula of Universal Law', 92). I differ from Korsgaard, however, in tracing the practical 
contradiction to an imagined piece of common knowledge rather than an imagined standard 
practice. (See note 20, above.) 
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wouldn't follow, after all; and so it doesn't follow, to begin with. 
A desire for money isn't a valid reason for making false promises. 
Its not being a reason is also a priori. And this point provides the 
most challenging twist in Kant's argument. Kant thought that we 
cannot wait passively to receive practical dictates with a priori 
authority, and hence that we cannot wait for the voice of conscience 
to speak.38 We have to propose our own practical dictates and ask 
whether they could possibly carry a priori authority. And some- 
times, when the answer is no, that answer turns out to carry the 
sought-for authority: it resounds with the voice of conscience. 
The practical dictate in the present example is the maxim that 
making a false promise follows from circumstances of financial 
need. That the validity of this inference must be a priori is itself a 
priori, since validity is a matter of rationality, which is common to 
all thinkers. From the a priori requirement that the validity of an 
inference must be a priori, the impossibility of a valid inference 
from financial need to false promises follows a priori as well. 
Anyone can see, and can see that anyone can see, that the validity 
of this inference would have to be a priori, but that one of the 
inference's presuppositions would then be false, so that the 
inference wouldn't be valid, after all. The fact that the validity of 
such an inference would have to be common knowledge, which 
would invalidate the inference-this fact is itself common 
knowledge among all who care to reflect on the matter. So when 
the question is whether a need for money is a reason for making 
false promises, anyone can see that the answer is no, and that 
anyone can see it, and so on. 
Here, finally, is a dictate of conscience, reverberating with the 
appropriate authority. Conscience tells us that the reasons we 
thought we had for doing something couldn't be reasons for doing 
it; and it tells us authoritatively, once and for all. They couldn't be 
reasons for doing it, conscience tells us, because their being reasons 
couldn't be seen, and be seen to be seen, by all. And what 
conscience here points out to us is something that can be seen, and 
seen to be seen, by all. Thus, conscience authoritatively reveals that 
our proposed reasons for acting couldn't be authoritative and 
consequently couldn't be reasons. 
38. See again the passage quoted in note 14, above. 
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The role of autonomy. But isn't conscience supposed to forbid us 
from doing things rather than merely inform us that we don't have 
reason for doing them? 
Kant's answer, I think, would be that by informing us of the 
absence of reasons for doing things, conscience rules out the 
possibility of our doing them for reasons and, with it, the possibility 
of our doing them autonomously-or, indeed, the possibility of our 
doing them, since we are truly the agents of the things we do only 
when we do them for reasons. And ruling out the possibility of our 
being the agents of the things we do is the way that conscience 
forbids us from doing them at all. 
Kant says:39 
[M]orality lies in the relation of actions to the autonomy of the 
will.... An action which is compatible with the autonomy of the will 
is permitted; one which does not harmonize with it is forbidden. 
Kant could have put his point differently. An action that is 
incompatible with the autonomy of the will isn't, properly 
speaking, an action at all: it's a piece of behaviour unattributable 
to an agent, a bodily movement in which there is nobody home. So 
put, of course, the point seems to be that we won't do the forbidden 
thing-or, at least, that we won't do it. Yet this point is compatible 
with the recognition that we might still do the forbidden thing in 
the weaker sense of 'do' that includes nonautonomous behaviour. 
As I interpret Kant, the recognition that we could do something 
only nonautonomously deters us from doing the thing even in this 
weaker sense. The deterrent force of this recognition derives from 
our reverence for the idea of ourselves as rational and autonomous 
beings. 
Kant speaks of a 'paradox' with the following content: 'that 
without any further end or advantage to be attained[,] the mere 
dignity of humanity, that is, of rational nature in man-and 
consequently that reverence for a mere idea-should function as 
an inflexible precept for the will.'40 In other words, the 
prescriptive force of moral dictates is a force registered in our 
reverence for the idea of ourselves as rational and autonomous 
beings. Conscience tells us that if we do something, we shall have 
39. Groundwork 107 (439). 
40. 106 (439). 
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to do it nonautonomously, without reason; and conscience thereby 
appeals to our reverence for this self-ideal as a motive against 
doing the thing at all. 
The Kantian ego ideal. I have now returned to the idea that Kant 
resembles Freud in positing an ego ideal. This ideal is necessary to 
motivate our adherence to the conclusions that result from applying 
the categorical imperative-the conclusions that I have identified 
with the dictates of conscience. These conclusions authoritatively 
refute our proposed reasons for acting; but in order to deter us from 
acting, they must engage our respect for the conception of 
ourselves as acting only for reasons. Moral requirements thus 
motivate us via an ideal image of our obeying them. 
I believe that the ego ideal plays a similar role in Freudian 
theory.41 Freud sometimes speaks as if the commands of the super- 
ego are backed by threats and obeyed by the ego solely out of fear. 
In fact, however, his descriptions of the relations between ego and 
super-ego depend heavily on the ego's admiration for the super- 
ego, as an internalized object of love. And it is in this latter capacity 
that the super-ego is described by Freud as being, or as including, 
an ego ideal. 
I believe that Freud's theory of the ego ideal can help us to 
humanize Kant's ideal of ourselves as rationally autonomous. It 
can help us to see that what Kant called 'reverence for a mere 
idea' -reverence, that is, for 'the mere dignity of humanity'42-is 
in fact our response to something that we have internalized from 
real people in the course of our moral development. More 
specifically, I believe that the object of this reverence, the ideal of 
ourselves as rationally autonomous, is an ideal that we acquire in 
the course of loving our parents, in the manner described by Freud. 
But my reasons for this belief will have to wait for another 
occasion. 
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